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Jeffrey M. Weissman**
The efficacy of any piece of remedial legislation depends,
of course, upon the extent to which it is enforced. However, the
enforcement of a statute is, in turn, dependent upon the nature
of the jurisdiction conferred upon the enforcement agency.
Where the jurisdictional grant is couched in vague language,
imperfectly meshed with existing jurisdictional statutes, or eas-
ily hampered, the purposes of the statute may frequently be
frustrated. The authors of this article examine the jurisdictional
provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
emphasizing the effect of the categorization of summary and
plenary jurisdiction upon the statute's operation. The authors
conclude that the jurisdictional reach under the 1970Act should
be expanded and made more precise, in order to effectuate fully
the legislative intent.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 [hereinafter
referred to alternatively as the "1970 Act" or "SIPA"]1 was a
response to numerous failures of broker-dealer firms in the late
1960's. The statute was designed to restore public confidence in
the financial stability of the securities industry by protecting
* B.A., Radcliffe College; LL.B., New York University Law School; Member, New
York Bar; Adjunct Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School; formerly Assistant Regional
Administrator, New York Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commi'sion.
** S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.A.T., Harvard Graduate School
of Education; J.D., New York University School of Law.
I Act of December 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, § 1(a) et seq., 84 Stat. 1636,15 U.S.C.
§ 78aaa et seq. (1970).
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individual investors from loss through the availability of a special
insurance fund; by alleviating the domino effect of the failure of
one firm upon other securities firms; and by providing for a spe-
cialized and expedited procedure for the liquidation of financially
distressed firms. The aims of SIPA were clear and laudatory.
Unfortunately, however, the statute was drafted so hastily and
poorly that its objectives, particularly that of expedition, have
not been attained.
One of the major obstacles to an easy interpretation of the
1970 Act is its haphazard incorporation by reference of the provi-
sions of other federal statutes. This article will discuss one of the
results of such disjointed structuring, i.e., the unnecessarily ab-
struse nature of SIPA court jurisdiction.
The 1970 Act created the Securities Investor Protection Cor-
poration [hereinafter referred to as "SIPC"], a non-profit mem-
bership corporation comprised of broker-dealers, which organiza-
tion plays a significant role in the administration of the statute.
SIPC initiates liquidations under the 1970 Act by making appli-
cation to a federal district court for a decree adjudicating the
customers of a SIPC member to be in need of the protections of
the 1970 Act.' SIPC then selects a trustee and a counsel for the
trustee.3 Thereafter, SIPC supplies any necessary funds for the
payment of customer claims insured under the 1970 Act,4 the
completion of certain open contractual commitments,5 and the
costs of administration.
In addition to establishing a fund for the payment of cus-
tomer claims, the 1970 Act was to provide a streamlined bank-
ruptcy procedure for liquidating SIPC members, which would
avoid the delays and inequities of a broker-dealer bankruptcy
pursuant to section 60(e) of the Bankruptcy Act.7 However, in-
stead of specifying the procedures which the trustee and the
courts were to follow in a SIPA liquidation, Congress provided in
section 6(c)(1) that,
2 Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 [hereinafter cited as SIPA] § 5(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970).
SIPA § 5(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (1970).
4 SIPA § 6(0(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(0(1) (1970).
SIPA §§ 6(d), (0(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(d), (f)(2) (1970).
SIPA §§ 6(b)(1)(A), (0(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(b)(1)(A), (0(2) (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HR. REP.
No. 1613]; Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., ch. I, pt. 1, 410 et seq. (1963), referring to Bankruptcy Act § 60(e), 11
U.S.C. § 96(e) (1970); Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970; An Early
Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 802, 829-31 (1973).
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[e]xcept as inconsistent with the provisions of this [Act] . . .
and except that in no event shall a plan of reorganization be
formulated, a liquidation proceeding shall be conducted in ac-
cordance with, and as though it were being conducted under, the
provisions of chapter X and such of the provisions (other than
section [60(e)]) of chapters I to VII, inclusive, of the Bank-
ruptcy Act as section [102] of [chapter X] would make
applicable if an order of the court had been entered directing
that bankruptcy be proceeded with pursuant to the provisions
of such chapters I to VII, inclusive .... 1
This somewhat confusing delineation of the jurisdiction and
powers of a court is made all the more perplexing by section 2 of
the 1970 Act, which also incorporates by reference the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter referred to as the "Exchange
Act"] as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this [Act]..., the provisions
of the [Exchange Act] . . . apply as if this [Act] . . . consti-
tuted an amendment to, and was included as a section of, such
Act.,
Finally, section 5(b)(2) of the 1970 Act provides that,
[u]pon the filing of an application pursuant to subsection
(a)(2) of this section, the court to which application is made
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor involved and its
property wherever located with the powers, to the extent consis-
tent with the purposes of this [Act] . . . , of a court of bank-
ruptcy and of a court in a proceeding under chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act.10
In numerous situations, a SIPA trustee cannot be sure where
or how to prosecute a claim, or whether the claim arises under the
1970 Act, or simply involves the estate of a SIPA debtor. Such
uncertainty, interfering with the prompt liquidation of the
debtor, should be needless. The new Bankruptcy Rules have pro-
vided for procedural similarities among actions under the sum-
mary jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, under the plenary juris-
diction of a bankruptcy court, and under the non-bankruptcy
jurisdiction of a federal district court.
SIPA § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff1(c)(1) (1970).
SIPA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78bbb (1970).
lo SIPA § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
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I. TYPES AND SOURCES OF JURISDICTION
A. Sources of Jurisdiction
Because of the manner in which SIPA is drafted, there exist
at least four possible sources of statutory authority for jurisdic-
tion of the SIPA court. The first jurisdictional provision which
might apply in a SIPA proceeding is section 27 of the Exchange
Act, which provides in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States
courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of viola-
tions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder."
Section 27 has been interpreted to allow private causes of action
to be heard in the federal district courts, even where a civil re-
medy for the claims asserted was not expressly provided for in the
Exchange Act.
2
The argument that section 27 applies to a SIPC proceeding
rests on at least two bases. First, section 5(a)(2) of the 1970 Act
specifically authorizes SIPC to apply "to any court of competent
jurisdiction" specified in section 27 or 21(e) of the Exchange
Act, 13 for a decree adjudicating that customers of a broker-dealer
member of SIPC are in need of protection. Secondly, section 2 of
the 1970 Act (quoted above) categorizes SIPA as an amendment
to the Exchange Act and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion [hereinafter referred to as the "SEC"] is granted rule-
making authority under SIPA. 4 Therefore, except as otherwise
provided under SIPA, United States district courts should have
the same jurisdiction in a SIPA liquidation which they enjoy
under section 27 of the Exchange Act.
SIPA does have a jurisdictional provision of its own, section
5(b)(2),' which is the second possible source of jurisdiction for a
SIPA court. Since this section speaks of "exclusive jurisdiction of
the debtor involved and its property,"'" it is not clear whether
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act] § 27, 16
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
'2 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 358-62 (2d Cir. 1973).
SIPA § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee (a)(2) (1970).
SIPA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(a) (1970), amending Exchange Act § 15(c)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1964); SIPA §§ 3(e)(3), 9(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ccc(e)(3), 78iii(f) (1970).
'5 SIPA § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2) (1970).
SIPA § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2) (1970).
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Congress intended jurisdiction of a SIPA court to be broader or
narrower than that of a district court hearing the case arising
under the Exchange Act. If the phrase "jurisdiction of the debtor
involved and its property wherever located" were given the broad-
est possible interpretation, a SIPA court could exercise jurisdic-
tion over property which is, or by possession or claim to ownership
might become, property of the debtor. As a general rule, for a case
to present a federal question as an original matter, a right arising
under the federal statute invoked for federal jurisdiction must be
an essential element of the case. 7 However, in a liquidation under
SIPA, unlike the customary Exchange Act controversy, the court
is administering the rights of various claimants to a res, to wit,
the debtor's estate as supplanted by the SIPC insurance fund.
Section 5(b)(2) of the 1970 Act does refer, however, to the
jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy and of a court in a proceed-
ing under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. Those jurisdictional
powers are incorporated by reference into SIPA proceedings to the
extent consistent with the purposes of the statute. Therefore, the
third possible source of jurisdiction is section 111 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which applies to chapter X reorganizations. The ju-
risdictional grant found in section 111 reads as follows:
Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the
court in which a petition is filed shall, for the purposes of this
chapter, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its pro-
perty, wherever located.s
Despite the parallel language of section 111 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and section 5(b)(2) of SIEPA, an argument may be
made that the full reach of the jurisdiction of a chapter X reor-
ganization court does not prevail in a SIPA liquidation. Rather,
it may be argued that the jurisdictional provisions of chapters I
through VII of the Bankruptcy Act apply. These provisions may
constitute another jurisdictional source because of the possible
effect of section 6(c)(1) of the 1970 Act, which makes applicable
to the liquidation "such of the provisions. . of chapters Ito VII,
inclusive, of the Bankruptcy Act as section 102 of Chapter X
would make applicable if an order of the court had been entered"
pursuant thereto. One of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act re-
ferred to in section 102,'1 which presumably would apply to a
SIPC liquidation according to this analysis, is section 23 As will
" Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
" Bankruptcy Act § 111, 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 23, 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
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be more fully explained below, section 23(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act limits the bankruptcy court's plenary jurisdiction, and, ac-
cordingly, a chapter X reorganization court is generally believed
to have more ample jurisdiction than a bankruptcy court
administering a liquidation proceeding pursuant to chapters I to
VII.21
Section 2(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, applicable both to
reorganization and liquidation proceedings, provides, in part,
that courts of bankruptcy are "invested . . . with such jurisdic-
tion at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction in proceedings under this [Act] . . .to .. .cause
the estates of bankrupts to be collected . . . and determine con-
troversies .. .thereto .... ,,22 A major distinction which may
be drawn between jurisdiction originating under section 27 of the
Exchange Act on the one hand, and jurisdiction arising from
section 5(b)(2) of the 1970 Act or provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act on the other, is that the former covers all Exchange Act duties
and liabilities, the latter, "property of the debtor." The difference
is basically that between in personam and in rem approaches to
jurisdiction. A question as to the type of federal jurisdiction being
used consequently arises where the Exchange Act duty or liability
is determinative of the ownership or disposition of property of the
debtor. In such instances, one might construe section 27 of the
Exchange Act to be inapplicable, in view of the "except as other-
wise provided" restriction upon Exchange Act incorporation as
set forth in section 2 of SIPA. On the other hand, there might be
construed to be an alternative or concurrent jurisdiction under
section 27 and the property-of-the-debtor jurisdictional provi-
sions of section 5 of SIPA. One common situation in which an
Exchange Act proscription affects the debtor's property in a
broker-dealer liquidation is the unlawful conversion of hypothe-
cation of securities contrary to rule 15c2-1 under the Exchange
Act.?
The fact that there are four possible sources of jurisdictional
authority for a SIPA court should not mislead the participants in
a SIPA proceeding to the erroneous conclusion that there is suffi-
cient authority for the court to adjudicate whatever controversy
is immediately at hand. In fact, depending upon which provision
is determined to be the source of jurisdiction for the court, the
constitutional nature of the judicial authority, the location of the
2, See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
2 Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1 (1973).
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forum, and the rules of procedure applicable may be quite
different. It is the purpose of this article to analyze which of the
jurisdictional provisions are most appropriate to accomplishing
the congressional purposes behind SIPA, and to set into relief
those areas in which clarification of the source and nature of the
court's jurisdiction would eliminate interesting but pointless liti-
gation.
B. Delegation to a Bankruptcy Judge
Although the SIPA liquidation proceeding is commenced and
generally conducted before a federal district court judge, it has
been the practice of some district court judges, particularly in the
Southern District of New York, to refer the case in whole or in
part to a bankruptcy judge. Neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history directly authorizes or prohibits such a refe-
rence. Two threshold questions therefore arise: whether or not
delegation of the SIPA proceeding to a bankruptcy judge is au-
thorized, and what effects, if any, such delegation has upon the
proceeding.
Bankruptcy Judge Herzog takes the position that reference
by the district court judge to the bankruptcy judge, as a general
proposition, is a lawful exercise of the judicial power granted to
the district judge in a SIPA adjudication. 2 He arrives at this
conclusion by a rather straightforward analysis of section 6(c)(1)2
of SIPA, which incorporates applicable Bankruptcy Act provi-
sions into SIPA. Since he sees no inconsistency between the pro-
visions or purposes of SIPA and those of the Bankruptcy Act, he
believes that reference is authorized by either section 22z' of ordi-
nary bankruptcy or section 117 of chapter X.2 He does, how-
ever, favor section 22 as the source for the delegation of authority,
on the theory that the SIPA proceeding is more akin to a liquida-
tion than to a reorganization. Nevertheless, whether section 22 or
section 117 applies, the outcome is the same: the district judge
can retain the entire matter, refer the entire matter to a bank-
ruptcy judge, qua bankruptcy judge, or refer the entire matter or
any part thereof to the bankruptcy judge as special master to hear
and report.
21 3 COLLMR ON BANKRUPTCY [hereinafter cited as COLuER] r 60.8613.2] at 1257
(14th ed. 1972).
SIPA § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1) (1970).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 22, 11 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). as modificd by B.,nRt:v r R. 102
(1973).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 117, 11 U.S.C. § 517 (1970).
1974]
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Judge Herzog buttresses his case for the incorporation of
Bankruptcy Act delegation by noting that section 628 of SIPA
speaks of the "court." For those accustomed to the language of
bankruptcy, the "court" is defined in section 1(9) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act 2 to include either the district judge or the bankruptcy
judge, thus possibly evincing an indirect approval by Congress of
SIPA proceedings being conducted before a bankruptcy judge.
We would reach a different conclusion as to the meaning of
the word "court" under the 1970 Act. Under section 5 of SIPA,30
the word "court" appears repeatedly in such a context as to indi-
cate clearly that only a district judge could have been intended
as the subject of the term.' It seems highly implausible that
Congress could have intended the initial adjudication of customer
need for the 1970 Act's protection to take place before a bank-
ruptcy judge. Similarly, although it is the "court" which appoints
the trustee in those cases where liquidation is necessary, we be-
lieve that it was there intended that the court be that of the
district judge. In fact, the incorporation argument of section
6(c)(1) can apply only if a liquidation proceeding has actually
commenced, since there can be no "liquidation proceeding"
within the meaning of section 6 of SIPA until the judge of the
district court has determined that one is necessary.
It should also be noted that section 38 of the Bankruptcy
Act32 invests the bankruptcy judge with jurisdiction over only
specified matters. For example, the bankruptcy judge has juris-
diction over all "petitions" which are referred to him. Section
1(24) of the Bankruptcy Act 33 defines a petition as a document
filed in the bankruptcy court initiating a proceeding "under this
title," to wit, the Bankruptcy Act, title 11 of the United States
Code. However, the application for a liquidation proceeding
under SIPA originates from title 15, and not from title 11. The
other jurisdictional grants of section 38 conferred upon the bank-
ruptcy judge (e.g., to grant, deny, or revoke discharges) relate to
specific bankruptcy matters, and also might not apply to a title
15 proceeding.
The point of these rebuttals to Judge Herzog is not to assert
the proposition that there is no authority for delegating to bank-
z" SIPA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78fir (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 1(9), 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1970).
SIPA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(1970).
, See SIPA 99 5(a)(2), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee(a)(2), (b) (1970).
" Bankruptcy Act § 38, 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 1(24), 11 U.S.C. § 1(24) (1970).
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ruptcy referees the administration and adjudication of SIPA
liquidations. The purpose of our arguments is, rather, merely to
point out that the authority for so referring a case requires further
clarification. A bankruptcy judge may well be the judicial officer
best equipped and suited to preside over a variety of the aspects
of SIPA liquidations. However, those problems which are unique
to a SIPA proceeding, or which involve *interpretations of the
Exchange Act, perhaps should be retained or more actively super-
vised by the district judge. SIPA would, otherwise, be vulnerable
to the argument that delegation to a referee of a particular matter
is inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of SIPA. In addi-
tion, it would seem a more appropriate distribution of judicial
power to reserve for adjudication in the district court 1970 Act
and Exchange Act matters which rarely arise in day-to-day bank-
ruptcy proceedings, while delegating to the referee those matters
which might generally be called "matters of administration."
C. The Distinction Between Summary and Plenary Jurisdiction
As a consequence of the operation of sections 5(b)(2) and
6(c)(1) of the 1970 Act, whenever the jurisdiction of the SIPA
court over the debtor's property is challenged, it becomes neces-
sary to determine (1) the extent of jurisdiction of ordinary bank-
ruptcy and chapter X courts, (2) which jurisdictional grant, if the
above indeed be different, is applicable, and (3) whether or not
such jurisdiction is "consistent with the purposes of [the 1970]
Act." Accordingly, the fact that a court of bankruptcy or a chap-
ter X court would be unable to subject particular property of the
debtor to its jurisdiction should not preclude a SIPA court from
exercising its broad jurisdiction where the limitations placed
upon the jurisdiction of a court proceeding under the Bankruptcy
Act would frustrate the purposes of SIPA.
1. Jurisdiction "under" the Bankruptcy Act
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in depth the
many complex considerations which determine the scope of
federal jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act.31 However, some
" See 2 COLLIER 23.01, supra note 24, at 433 et seq. (for an extensive treatment of
bankruptcy jurisdiction); 5A RFMINGTON ON BANKRUTFCY § 2350 at 62 et seq. (Sth ed. 193,
Supp. 1973); Seidman, Summary or Plenary Jurisdiction, 77 Cos. L.J. 73 (1972); Note,
Katchen v. Landy and Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy, 52 VA. L. REV. 1530 (196);




understanding of the distinction between summary and plenary
bankruptcy jurisdiction is necessary to appreciate more fully the
jurisdictional problems under SIPA.
Whenever a federal district court adjudicates directly under
the Bankruptcy Act a matter pertaining to the estate of the
debtor, it is said to exercise summary jurisdiction over the pro-
perty which is the subject of adjudication. In such a controversy,
the district court is sitting as a court of bankruptcy, and the
source of the court's jurisdiction is the Bankruptcy Act.
In contrast to summary jurisdiction, whenever a state court
or a district court entertains an independent suit upon a matter
which is not part of the administration of the estate, but never-
theless pertains to the debtor's estate, the court is said to exercise
plenary jurisdiction. In such a controversy, the federal district
court does not sit as a bankruptcy court; nor does a bankruptcy
judge have jurisdiction over a plenary suit.
In an unending line of cases, judges, attorneys and parties
have done battle over whether a suit should proceed in summary
or plenary fashion. Summary jurisdiction exists over matters con-
cerning administration of the debtor's estate, over all property
within the actual or constructive possession of the court, over all
property to which timely objection to the exercise of jurisdiction
has not been made, and over various disputes expressly made
subject to such jurisdiction by statute.
In an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, section 2(a)(7) of the
Bankruptcy Act 'n confers both summary and plenary jurisdiction
upon the federal district courts. When the property which is the
subject matter of the dispute is in the physical possession of the
court or its agents, summary jurisdiction is clearly appropriate to
determine any disputes concerning that property.30 Similarly,
when the property is in the possession of a third party, summary
jurisdiction may nonetheless be exercised if the party in posses-
sion expressly or impliedly consents thereto, or waives any objec-
tions due to failure to file a timely objection under section 2(a)(7)
and Bankruptcy Rule 915(a) .3
However, when a third party is in possession of property
which is claimed to be the property of the bankrupt, and if the
Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970).
3 2 COLLIER, supra note 24, 23.05[2] at 471.
" See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944);
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271
U.S. 191 (1926); May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); Taubel.Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v.
Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
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party in possession does not consent or waive his objections to
summary jurisdiction, the claim must be adjudicated in a plenary
suit should the party assert a "substantial, adverse claim" to the
property. "- Section 23(b) of the Bankruptcy Act curtails the juris-
diction of the district courts in plenary suits by placing the
trustee in the prefiling shoes of the bankrupt for jurisdictional
purposes, thus requiring an independent non-bankruptcy ground
for federal jurisdiction. Otherwise, the trustee must resort to his
common law or statutory remedies in a state court, since pendent
jurisdiction cannot attach.
A significant exception to the jurisdictional limitations of
section 23(b) exists, however, in that a trustee in either an ordi-
nary or liquidation proceeding can institute plenary suits in the
federal district courts to enforce the rights provided by sections
60, 67, or 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.: In general, these are the
rights given to trustees to set aside preferences and fraudulent
conveyances. Sections 60(b), 67(e) and 70(e)(3) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act" give state courts and federal district courts concur-
rent jurisdiction over such actions. Despite some confusion in the
statutory language used, the better view is that a federal district
court hearing such a plenary action is sitting as a court of first
instance rather than as a court of bankruptcy."
Determination of whether or not a claim is substantial and
adverse, and, therefore, whether or not the limitations of section
23(b) apply, is no easy matter. The bankruptcy court is not
ousted of jurisdiction simply upon the assertion of an adverse
claim, since it has jurisdiction to determine whether the claim
constitutes a mere pretense to avoid jurisdiction (i.e., a "colora-
ble" claim). But if the claim is sufficiently well-founded as to
demonstrate a contested matter of right involving both fair doubt
and reasonable room for controversy in fact or in law, plenary suit
will be required.4 2 Those claims which are of particular impor-
tance to a SIPA proceeding, and which may be sufficient to re-
quire plenary suit, will be discussed below.
In a chapter X proceeding, the district court's plenary juris-
diction is not limited by section 23, in light of the provisions of
See cases cited in note 37 supra.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 67, 70, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107, 110 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(b), 67(e), 70(e)(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b), 107(e), 110(e)(3)
(1970).
" 2 CoLLmR, supra note 24, 23.15 at 605.
Z Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926).
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section 102.11 The result is that the reorganization court has the
full measure of summary and plenary jurisdiction established by
section 2(a)(7).11
In addition, the summary jurisdiction of a reorganization
court is more expansive than the summary jurisdiction of a liqui-
dation court. Since reorganization contemplates adjustment of
the various claims of creditors, it sometimes becomes necessary
for the reorganization court to exercise a more flexible summary
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that a party in possession
asserts a claim which would, in ordinary bankruptcy, be suffi-
ciently substantial and adverse to avoid summary jurisdiction."
Should the reorganization effort fail, however, and an order be
entered to proceed with liquidation instead, section 102 would
reinstate the section 23 limitations upon plenary jurisdiction, as
well as the stricter version of the substantial-adverse-claim test
of the summary jurisdiction which applies in ordinary bank-
ruptcy.
2. Summary Jurisdiction Under the SIPA
As stated previously, the court in a SIPA proceeding is given
jurisdiction coextensive with a court of bankruptcy and a court
proceeding under chapter X, unless the restrictions under the
Bankruptcy Act are inconsistent with the purposes of SIPA. It
therefore follows that the SIPA court must maintain all of the
usual summary and plenary jurisdictional distinctions unless it
can be shown that such distinctions would frustrate seriously the
purposes of SIPA.
Whenever the trustee's investigation uncovers facts which
would lead him to believe that securities, cash, or other property
in the possession of third persons are properly assets of the
debtor, he must determine whether a summary or plenary suit
would be the more appropriate method to obtain the property.
Substantive claims against the party in possession may arise
under the federal securities laws or other federal statutes, the
11 Section 102 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970), provides in pertinent
part: "The provisions of chapters I to VII, inclusive, of this Act shall, insofar as they are
not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter [XI, apply in proceed-
ings under this chapter . ..."
" Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(7) (1970).
," See Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936); In re
Lehigh & Hudson River Ry. Co., 468 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1972); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. Nat'l City Bank, 315 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
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preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the common law,
the Uniform Commercial Code or other state statutory laws, or
some combination thereof. If the SIPA court has summary juris-
diction, the trustee can conveniently litigate the issue of title in,
and as an incident of, the SIPA proceeding itself. However, if a
plenary suit is necessary, the appropriate forum might be the
SIPA court, some other federal district court, or even a distant
state court.
At least two bankruptcy judges" have determined that sec-
tion 23 of the Bankruptcy Act applies in a SIPA proceeding. Their
conclusion is derived from a rather straightforward literal reading
of section 6(c)(1) of the 1970 Act. Under this view, the SIPA
proceeding is treated as a liquidating reorganization under the
rules of ordinary bankruptcy. It would follow, therefore, that sec-
tion 23 of the Bankruptcy Act and the restrictive summary-
plenary jurisdictional distinctions would apply.
The only flaw in this line of reasoning is that it ignores the
proper consideration of whether or not a particular jurisdictional
limitation imposed upon a court of bankruptcy is "consistent
with the purposes" of SIPA. It would be a complete misreading
of the statute to refuse to consider whether the effects of the
restrictions on summary jurisdiction clash with the extent of ju-
risdiction required of a court in a SIPA proceeding to accomplish
its congressional purposes."
The legislative history of the 1970 Act generally indicates a
congressional intent to prevent serious erosion of confidence in
the securities markets as would be caused by broker-dealer fai-
lures, and a consequent domino-effect collapse. Congress set
forth, rather specifically, the purposes of a liquidation proceeding
under SIPA, as follows:
(1) as promptly as possible...
(A) to return specifically identifiable property to the cus-
tomers of the debtor entitled thereto;
(B) to distribute the single and separate fund, and (in
advance thereof or concurrently therewith) pay to customers
moneys advanced by SIPC. .. ;
(2) to operate the business of the debtor in order to complete
open contractual commitments of the debtor... ;
,1 3 Co r.R, supra note 24, 60.8611] at 1252 (Bankruptcy Judge Herzog); SEC v.
Morgan, Kennedy & Co. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Faw. SEC. L. REP. ' 94,563
at 95,966 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1974) (Bankruptcy Judge Babitt).
17 See text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
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(3) to enforce rights of subrogation as provided in this [Act]
.; and
(4) to liquidate the business of the debtor."'
Rather clearly, a pervasive goal of SIPA is to accomplish a
distribution of property and a resolution of claims in the mini-
mum time necessary. Expedition is in the interest of the debtor's
customers, since it would minimize the period during which they
would be unable to trade and consequently, at the risk of the well-
known volatility of securities market fluctuations." Promptness
is also necessary to complete certain open contractual commit-
ments between the debtor and other broker-dealers, thus mini-
mizing the disruption and possibility of domino-like collapse."
Were the SIPA court required to determine the existence or
absence of a substantial adverse claim sufficient to defeat sum-
mary jurisdiction, and were there a possibility that the trustee
would be obliged to resort to another forum, expensive litigation
and delay would necessarily result. Moreover, such delay would
produce no material benefit to any of the parties or witnesses
involved, especially since, with the adoption of the new Bank-
ruptcy Rules, the differences between summary and plenary suits
in the federal courts have been rendered minimal." Furthermore,
were the trustee to lack an independent non-bankruptcy ground
for federal jurisdiction, 52 he could not take advantage of the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction in order to have the entire claim
heard in a federal court. The trustee would then face the burden-
some prospect of litigating numerous potential claims in forums
all over the United States; he might, moreover, be obliged to
forego certain claims, were the dollar amounts insufficient to jus-
tify the necessary expenses of travel.
The question may be posed as to why a SIPA trustee should
SIPA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(a) (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 1613 at 9-10.
° Id. at 9.
See the Prefatory Note to Part VII (Adversary Proceedings) of the Bankruptcy
Rules, which begins: "The Part VII Rules incorporate by reference or adapt in part most
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and their numbering is correlated with that of
the Federal Rules." 1 COLLIER, supra note 24, at 179 (Special Supp. 1973).
5 ".. . United States District Courts will not have jurisdiction of plenary suits
against adverse claimants in possession where the general requirements of diversity of
citizenship and the minimum jurisdictional amount do not exist without their consent,
except where the suit is one under the provisions of §§ 60, 67 or 70." 2 COLLIER, supra note
24, 23.1514] at 614-15; Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1947); Lowenstein
v. Reikes, 60 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 669 (1933).
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not be subject to the same burdens in marshalling the assets of
an estate as is any other liquidation trustee. One answer is that
Congress has determined securities to be intricate merchandise
affected with a national public interest; "3 that the economic sta-
bility of the securities industry is essential to the economic stabi-
lity of the nation; and that the protection of broker-dealer cus-
tomers is sufficiently important to warrant provision for an insur-
ance fund by assessing members of the securities industry and
giving SIPC a one-billion-dollar call on the United States Treas-
ury.5' Since SIPA liquidations are financed by public funds, it
would be equitable for a SIPA trustee to recover assets for the
debtor's estate as promptly and inexpensively as possible.
Although a narrow view of the jurisdiction of a SEPA court
could have seriously adverse effects upon the entire congressional
scheme for SIPA, there is no specifically relevant information in
the legislative history as to whether or not summary jurisdiction
was to be limited-either pursuant to bankruptcy case law or via
section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act-in a SIPA proceeding. There
is, therefore, no direct evidence as to whether Congress intended
the SIPA court to be bound by those restrictions upon its sum-
mary jurisdiction which apply in an ordinary liquidation. All that
might be fairly said is that Congress intended to give the SIPA
court sufficiently broad jurisdiction to accomplish its purposes
without specifying many details of its powers.
There can be no doubt that Congress has the power to pro-
vide for summary jurisdiction to an extent broader than presently
available in ordinary bankruptcy or under chapter X:
Congress has, of course, power to confer upon the bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of trustees to
property adversely claimed. In matters relating to bankruptcy
its power is paramount. Hence, even if the property is not within
the possession of the bankruptcy court, Congress can confer
upon it, as upon any other lower federal court, jurisdiction of
the controversy, by conferring jurisdiction over the person in
whose possession the property is. Congress has, also (subject to
the constitutional guaranties), power to determine to what ex-
tent jurisdiction conferred, whether through possession of the
res or otherwise, shall be exercised by summary proceedings and
to what extent by plenary suit.5
Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
=' SIPA § 4(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(h) (1970); Duffy, Reforming SIPC, REV. SEc. lRE.
VOL. 7, No. 2 at 985 (January 31, 1974).
- Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1924).
19741
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has concluded that a broad
analysis of the impact of granting or denying summary jurisdic-
tion upon the congressional scheme is a proper method by which
to test the extent of such jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act:
With respect to the statutory question, it must be conceded
that the Bankruptcy Act does not in express terms confer sum-
mary jurisdiction to order claimants to surrender preferences.
But Congress has often left the exact scope of summary proceed-
ings in bankruptcy undefined, and this Court has elsewhere
recognized that in the absence of congressional definition this is
a matter to be determined by decisions of this Court after due
consideration of the structure and purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act as a whole, as well as the particular provisions of the Act
brought in question.
When Congress enacted general revisions of the bankruptcy
laws in 1898 and 1938, it gave special attention to the subject
of making the bankruptcy laws inexpensive in their administra-
tion. Moreover, this Court has long recognized that a chief pur-
pose of the bankruptcy laws is to secure a prompt and effectual
administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts
within a limited period, and that provision for summary disposi-
tion, without regard to usual modes of trial attended by some
necessary delay, is one of the means chosen by Congress to effec-
tuate that purpose . . . 6
Although the case from which the above quotation was de-
rived did not arise under a SIPA adjudication, the apparent pur-
poses behind SIPA surely present an imperative for the applica-
tion of broad, rather than narrow, summary jurisdiction.
Were the court in a SIPA liquidation to have only a limited
version of summary jurisdiction, Congress would have seriously
weakened the opportunities for a prompt and orderly liquidation
of failing broker-dealers. A more reasonable interpretation of the
statute, however, would be that Congress intended the SIPA
court to have extremely broad summary jurisdictional powers and
that any limitations to the contrary under the Bankruptcy Act
should be inapplicable.
D. Parties and Questions of Standing
In a SIPA liquidation, SIPC and the debtor are the only
parties to the proceeding. Nevertheless, the application by SIPC




pursuant to section 5(a)(2)5 7 of the 1970 Act may be, and fre-
quently is, brought in conjunction with an SEC action to enjoin
the debtor and its principals from further violations of the securi-
ties acts. Therefore, the SEC and persons associated with the
debtor may appear as parties in the caption of the proceeding.
Moreover, pursuant to section 5(c) of the 1970 Act,5 the SEC may
on its own motion file a notice of its appearance in any proceeding
under the Act and thereafter participate as a party.
Section 7(b) of the 1970 Act" empowers the SEC to bring suit
to require SIPC to discharge its obligations under SIPA. The
language of this section neither compels the SEC to act, nor ex-
pressly prohibits parties other than the SEC from bringing simi-
lar suits against SIPC. 0
In Bohart-McCaslin Ventures, Inc. v. Midwestern Securities
Corp.,6 the plaintiff sought to invoke the protection of SIPA by
requiring SIPC to intervene and commit its funds to a broker-
dealer liquidation. SIPC argued that the order sought by the
plaintiff be denied on two grounds: first, the debtor had ceased
all business activities prior to the effective date of SIPA, and
SIEPA was not intended to have retroactive effect; second, the
plaintiffs had no standing, irrespective of whether or not custo-
mers of the debtor were protected by SIPA. The court agreed with
SIPC on both points, interpreting section 7(b), 2 which empowers
the SEC to sue, to allow only the SEC as a proper party to force
SIPC action.63 The court also noted that there was no express
provision in the statute authorizing suits by parties other than
the SEC.64
One commentator, citing the Bohart decision with approval,
reasoned that SIPC's power to intervene must be discretionary,
SIPA § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970).
SIPA § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(c) (1970).
SIPA § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970).
Section 7(b) of SIPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970), reads as follows:
(b) Enforcement of actions.-In the event of the refusal of SIPC to commit its
funds or otherwise to act for the protection of customers of any member of SIPC,
the Commission may apply to the district court of the United States in which
the principal office of SIPC is located for an order requiring SIPC to discharge
its obligations under this chapter and for such other relief as the court may deem
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter.
' 352 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
SIPA § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970).
= Bohart-McCaslin Ventures, Inc. v. Midwestern Sec. Corp., 352 F. Supp. at 940.
6' Id. at 940-41.
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since its powers are limited to requests for liquidation. Because
SIPC lacks the power to cause the debtor's reorganization or reha-
bilitation, delay is the only available remedial alternative to li-
quidation, should the broker-dealer be able to surmount its finan-
cial difficulties on its own or through a merger. 5 In this connec-
tion, it should be noted that SIPC has the power to force a broker-
dealer, which is not actually bankrupt or insolvent, into liquida-
tion. 6
In a more recent case, SEC v. Guaranty Bond and Securities
Corp.,67 the Sixth Circuit considered the applicability of SIPA to
a broker-dealer who had become insolvent prior to the effective
date of the Act, but who had processed some 101 transactions
after the effective date. The receiver brought suit to require SIPC
to invoke the protection of the Act. SIPC raised the two-pronged
argument that had been raised in Bohart, i.e., non-retroactivity
and lack of standing. The SEC agreed in theory with the receiver
that SIPA should apply where the number of transactions after
the effective date of SIPA was substantial, but agreed with SIPC
that the receiver had no standing to raise the argument.
The lower court concluded that SIPA was inapplicable be-
cause the broker-dealer had become insolvent prior to the effec-
tive date, but accepted the receiver's argument that parties other
than the SEC are proper plaintiffs to sue SIPC. The Sixth Circuit
held that the receiver was correct on both counts: sufficient tran-
sactions were entered into after the effective date, and the re-
ceiver was a proper plaintiff. The circuit court found unconvinc-
ing the argument that, since there was no express provision for
customers or representatives to bring suit to force SIPC to act, no
such suit was possible. Moreover, the court noted in footnote,"8
section 3(b)(1) of SIPAI9 provides that SIPC has the corporate
power to sue and to be sued, to complain and to defend, in its
corporate name in any state or federal court, thus evincing some
minimal, indirect congressional intent that SIPC could be sued
in the normal manner. Most importantly, the court noted that
Guttman, Broker-Dealer Bankruptcies, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 887, 930-31 (1973).
" Among the five grounds listed in section 5(b)(1)(A) of SIPA, 15 U.S.C. §
78eee(b)(1)(A) (1970), upon which a district court can base a decree requiring liquidation
are failure to comply with the financial responsibility or hypothecation rules under the
Exchange Act, or inability to make computations necessary to establish compliance with
such regulations.
496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. SIPC v. Barbour, 43
U.S.L.W. 3021 (July 20, 1974).
Id. at 150 n.5.
" SIPA § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b)(1) (1970).
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Congress could not have intended customers to be without a
remedy in the event that SIPO and the SEC are inactive where
the statute arguably affords the plaintiff its protection."
The merits of the Bohart and Guaranty Bond decisions,
namely, whether SIPC can be compelled to advance its funds in
a suit by a party other than the SEC, are beyond the scope of this
article, and we therefore do not express any opinion as to them.
However, there is a preliminary question presented, which has
not been discussed in the reported decisions, as to the jurisdic-
tional basis for such private suits against SIPC. Where a SIPA
liquidation is in fact pending, SIPC is a party to the proceeding,
and therefore summary jurisdiction would lie so as to subject
SIPC to an order requiring it to advance funds for a particular
customer claim. Where no SIPA proceeding is yet pending, the
jurisdictional basis could not originate from the summary powers
of a liquidation court. The most obvious and, in our opinion, the
correct source for in personam jurisdiction would then become the
Exchange Act's exclusive jurisdiction over suits involving Ex-
change Act duties as previously discussed.7
Ordinarily, the filing of a claim by a creditor makes the credi-
tor a formal party to a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding.2
Furthermore, the filing of such a claim is deemed a consent to the
court's jurisdiction over related counterclaims by the trustee.3 In
a SIPC proceeding, claims are filed with the trustee rather than
with the court.74 Presumably, claimants nevertheless become par-
ties to the proceeding, and cannot thereafter extricate themselves
from the jurisdiction of the court if the trustee should assert a
counterclaim against them.
Where the debtor has been conducting business as a sole
proprietorship, the SIPC court has jurisdiction over all property
7' SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d at 150.
7, See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. Interestingly enough, the plaintiff in
Guaranty Bond served SIPC pursuant to the Tennessee "long arm" statute, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-235 et seq., rather than the more liberal provisions of section 27 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), and SIPC disputes such service on due process grounds.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 24-26, SIPC v. Barbour, 43 U.S.L.W. 3021 (July 20,
1974) (arguing that SIPC neither does, nor transacts, business in Tennesee merely be-
cause the self-regulating exchanges act as SIPC's collecting agent for SIPC assezsments).
- Creditors are among the "parties in interest" in a bankruptcy proceeding. However,
creditors who do not file timely claims are not entitled to further notice of the proceedings.
Bankruptcy R. 203(d) (1973).
' Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
7 SIPA §§ 6(g),(j), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff(g),(j) (1970).
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owned by the sole proprietor, including property which was re-
garded by him as personal and which was not contributed to the
business of the broker-dealer. 5 Where the debtor is a partnership,
section 5(d) of the Bankruptcy Act would give the court jurisdic-
tion over all of the general partners of the broker-dealer and over
all partnership and individual property." Where the debtor is a
corporation, section 7(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that one
or more officers, members of its board of directors, or stockholders
may be designated to perform the duties imposed upon the bank-
rupt; such a designated person would become a formal party to
the SIPC proceeding. However, for a variety of reasons, the courts
in SIPC liquidation proceedings have not always designated any
individuals pursuant to section 7(b).1
One reason for the perplexitites of the jurisdiction of a SIPA
court is that SIPC, a quasi-governmental agency, is an active
party in the liquidation proceeding, in many respects supplanting
the role of a debtor's creditors. 8 Nevertheless, the court's jurisdic-
7S SEC v. Wick, 360 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
' Bankruptcy Act § 5(d), 11 U.S.C. § 23(d) (1970).
' Bankruptcy Act section 7(b), 11 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1970), allows such designation; but
under section 7(a)(10), 11 U.S.C. § 25 (a)(10) (1970), the effect of designation would be
to give the designee derivative immunity and use immunity, i.e., no testimony given by
the designee, nor fruits derived therefrom, can be offered in evidence against him in any
criminal proceeding, except such testimony as he may give in the hearings upon objections
to his discharge. This might be unacceptable to SIPC or to the SEC in those cases in which
the principals are themselves guilty of wrongdoing, unless adequate procedures are
adopted to assure that prosecution of such principals is not prejudiced by the taint of
compelled testimony.
"' An illustration of SIPC's power is found in the process of selecting the debtor's
trustee and counsel. In ordinary bankruptcy, the creditors elect a trustee pursuant to
section 44(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1970). The court will then appoint
the creditor's nominee, but only if he meets the affirmative qualifications of competence,
disinterestedness, and the posting of a bond. Bankruptcy Act §§ 45, 50(b), 11 U.S.C. §§
73, 78(b); Bankruptcy R. 201(0, 209(d) (1973). Furthermore, should the creditor's selec-
tion fail to qualify as trustee, the court may appoint a replacement without an election,
In re Eloise Curtis, Inc., 388 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1967).
Although the role of the court is an active one in the appointment of a trustee in
bankruptcy, its role under SIPA is much narrower. SIPC has replaced creditors vis.a-vis
the selection of a trustee and counsel, and has been given more expansive powers. Section
5(b)(3) of SIPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (1970), provides that the court "shall" appoint
SIPC's nominee, but does not provide explicit standards, other than that of disinteres.
tedness, to test the competence of the nominee. One judge rejected this congressional
allocation of power as violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, but was overruled
without opinion. SEC v. Oxford Securities, Ltd., 354 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 486
F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1973).
Part of the statutory scheme of the 1970 Act is that SIPC becomes the subrogee of
customers to whom it advances funds, and thus may become the largest creditor of the
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tion is based not upon its power over SIPC, nor upon any rights
and obligations set forth in the 1970 Act, but, rather, upon ex-
press provision in the statute for jurisdiction over the debtor and
its property. It seems that in this oblique attempt to transplant
the Bankruptcy Act to the Exchange Act, through the mechanism
of the 1970 Act, the SIPA court has been given excessive adminis-
trative jurisdiction and an insufficient portion of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
79
I. PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING EXCLUSIVE JURISDIcTION OVER THE
DEBTOR INVOLVED AND ITS PROPERTY
A. The Nature of the Debtor's Property
The property of a debtor being liquidated under SIPA fre-
quently will not be physically located on the premises of the
broker-dealer, and may not even be in the possession of its agents
or under its control. Moreover, much of the property which the
debtor will have in its possession or under its control is likely to
be owned by customers of the broker-dealer, and therefore will be
property which the debtor is holding in safekeeping or as colla-
teral for a loan to a margin customer.
Such property of customers, if not "specifically identifiable,"
becomes part of the "single and separate fund.""0 The trustee is
given specific power to recover for the single and separate fund
property transferred by the debtor illegally, and for the purposes
of such recovery, the property is "deemed to have been the pro-
perty of the debtor."'"
debtor. See Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970; An Eart Assessment,
73 COLUm. L. REV. 802, 838-40 (1973). For another illustration of a situation in which SIPC
has been treated as a "super-creditor," see note 99 infra.
The REPORT OF THE COsmUssION OF THE BAN,'RLrcy L.mws OF TnE UN=rrE STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Part I, ser. 130344; Part I, ser. 13034-5) (July
1973) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Report], has reached substantially similar conclu-
sions about misallocation of administrative and judicial functions in ordinary bankruptcy.
At present, SIPA trustees receive court approval for such inconsequential administrative
matters as selling the debtor's office furniture and equipment; that same court may
nevertheless lack jurisdiction over critical matters such as pledged securities.
8' SIPA § 6(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(B) (1970).
, SIPA § 6(c)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(D) (1970). A construction argument
could be made that since property recoverable as an illegal transfer, such as unlawfully
hypothecated securities, is deemed to be "property of the debtor," it should be subject to
the jurisdictional grant to the SIPA court, under section 5(b)(2) of SIPA, 15 U.S.C. §
78eee(b)(2) (1970), as to the "debtor involved and its property." If such a construction
were accepted, the party in possession could not successfully assert a failure of summary
jurisdiction by virtue of the party's making a substantial adverse claim.
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The preponderant value of assets of the debtor and its cus-
tomers will be in securities and cash. Such securities are highly
volatile and may dissipate in value very quickly after a bank-
ruptcy, particularly in situations where the debtor has been mak-
ing a market in, or otherwise sponsoring securities long in, its own
proprietary accounts or the accounts of its customers.
As explained above, in an ordinary liquidation proceeding
pursuant to chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act, the
assertion of an adverse claim by a person in the possession of the
bankrupt's property will defeat the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. Even in a reorganization proceeding, where the
court has the power to interfere with valid liens and reclassify
creditors, the court's summary jurisdiction may be lost over pro-
perty which the debtor has transferred to a person who has not
filed a claim or otherwise participated in, or become a party to,
the bankruptcy proceedings.
There are a variety of situations in which conflicting
claims-by a trustee, customer of the debtor, or other persons-to
moneys or securities which immediately prior to the bankruptcy
were in the possession or under the control of the debtor, might
most expeditiously be adjudicated by the SIPC court. However,
if the persons in possession of such property on the filing date of
the proceeding are not parties to the proceeding and are in a
position to assert substantial adverse claims to the property, a
serious challenge to the jurisdiction of the SIPC court to adjudi-
cate these claims may be made.
B. Pledged Property
In the ordinary course of business as a broker and dealer in
securities, a firm will receive securities and cash as collateral for
loans, and, in turn, will act as a pledgor of securities and cash.
In the process of a SIPC liquidation, two types of claims may
alternatively be asserted by or against the debtor with respect to
such property. These are the claims of a secured creditor with a
perfected lien on property, and the claims of set-off.2 Ordinarily,
the person attempting to establish the position of a secured credi-
tor with a perfected lien will be doing so pursuant to the provi-
sions of section 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code, claiming
that status as a lienholder was acquired when possession of the
securities or cash was obtained. Section 9-104(i) of the Code pro-
" See Bankruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
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vides an exemption for rights of set-off. This does not make set-
off a mutually exclusive right from that of a secured creditor with
a perfected lien. Rather, these are alternate rights arising from
different relationships between the debtor and creditor with re-
spect to the property pledged or given.
The most common type of account, in which a broker-dealer
will be holding securities as collateral for a loan, is that of the
margin account customer. In such an arrangement, the customer
owes the amount of his debit balance to the broker-dealer and
such debt is collateralized by securities in the customer's ac-
count. It is often the case, however, that the broker-dealer will
have rehypothecated such customer's securities with a bank in
order to obtain the funds necessary to finance the broker-dealer's
margin accounts. Pursuant to the SEC's hypothecation and cus-
tomer protection rules, s the bank should be on notice, when mak-
ing such a loan, that the securities hypothecated are customers'
securities to the extent that such securities are fully paid for, or
in excess of applicable margin requirements. However, failing
broker-dealers frequently have not complied with either the hy-
pothecation or customer protection rules of the SEC, and custom-
ers' securities have been commingled with other securities and
pledged as collateral in day loans or overnight loans from banks
to broker-dealers. In such a situation, a SIPC trustee may have a
valid claim against the bank. On the other hand, the bank, under
certain circumstances, may be protected in its right to retain
securities so pledged, even though the pledge was wrongful.
Another form of commercial arrangement in which a broker-
dealer acts as pledgee is the obtaining by a broker-dealer of secu-
rities loans for a cash deposit. This type of borrowing may origi-
nate because of short sales by customers.8'
There are many classes of transactions in which a broker-
dealer pledges its property, or the property of its customers, in
order to obtain a loan. The most common type of pledge relation-
ship will arise with those banks with which a broker-dealer has
established banking relationships. The most significant type of
short-term financing for the average clearing firm will be its bro-
ker's loan, which is usually indispensable to the continuation of
its business. The nature of this loan will fluctuate from night to
day: at night, it is a secured loan; during the day, it is an unse-
11 Rules 15c2-1 and 15c3-3 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16c2-1, 3-3
(1973).
8' See § 6(h) of Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.6(h) (1974).
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cured loan. The bank's status with respect to the collateral
pledged for such a loan will ordinarily be that of a secured credi-
tor. In addition, the bank probably will have rights of set-off
where the broker-dealer has other accounts at the bank.
A broker-dealer is also likely to have loans granted against
securities being drafted by the lending bank to other broker-
dealers, pursuant to debtor's orders. For purposes of the 1970 Act,
these transactions, as between the debtor and the broker-dealers
involved, most likely constitute open contractual commitments
pursuant to section 6(d). However, so far as the bank is con-
cerned, these clearing arrangements are fully secured extensions
of credit. 6
The broker-dealer may also have made stock loans to other
broker-dealers for cash deposits. These deposits probably are in-
struments with respect to which the lending broker-dealer has a
perfected lien under section 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.87 Such lending broker-dealers also should have rights of set-
off with respect to the cash deposits.
More conventional types of deposits, common to any busi-
ness enterprise, are also likely to have been made by a bankrupt
broker-dealer. Examples of such deposits are those to landlords
as security for a lease, to manufacturers who have leased equip-
ment to the broker-dealers, to the telephone company and other
utilities, and similar arrangements. Deposits more unique to the
securities industry will have been made to stock clearing
corporations of securities and commodities exchanges.
There would appear to be no reason to treat the type of
conventional deposit of cash to a landlord, a manufacturer, or a
utility any differently in a SIPC liquidation than in any other
bankruptcy proceeding. However, where customers' securities
have been pledged by broker-dealers to persons who are not par-
ties to the SIPC proceeding, it would appear extremely detrimen-
tal to the interests of the debtor's estate and the customers of the
debtor, as well as SIPC, were a trustee to be compelled to litigate
any claims he might have against the pledgees in any forum other
than the bankruptcy court.
The present structure of the 1970 Act requires that customers
SIPA § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(d) (1970).
See § 2(g) of Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.2(g) (1974).
'7 See In re Atlantic Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966), a/J'd sub nomn.
Sanders v. Nat'l Acceptance Co., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967); Coogan, Kripke & Weiss,
The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money
and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HAIV. L. REv.
229, 263 (1965).
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who have valid claims against a SIPC trustee receive either the
securities long in an account on the filing date of the SIPC pro-
ceeding, or the cash value on that date of such securities in lieu
of delivery in kind. If the trustee is unable to deliver the securities
in kind, whether or not the securities were fully paid for by the
customer, the customer must, in effect, suffer a forced sale of the
securities on a filing date. Therefore, to the extent the trustee is
unable to recover customers' securities from pledgees, those cus-
tomers will be forced to take cash in lieu of such securities. Prior
to the time of the distribution, the securities may fluctuate in
value. If the trustee is compelled to litigate his claim to any such
securities in a plenary action, even greater fluctuation in value
could occur. At the same time, SIPC has taken the position that
it is not authorized to advance funds to a trustee for repayment
of any bank loans even if his object be the recovery of customers'
securities. Accordingly, the only practical way in which a trustee
may recover such securities is through litigation.
As set forth above, the court in a SIPC proceeding can stay
the enforcement of liens or rights of set-off, but may not abrogate
them. Consequently, although a trustee would be able to prevent
a pledgee from foreclosing on collateral during the time litigation
was pending in another forum, such a stay would not seem to be
in the best interests of either the estate or the creditor: one, or
the other, or both, would be forced to take a market risk during
the course of this litigation concerning the respective rights to the
pledged securities.
In an ordinary liquidation proceeding, a creditor could defeat
the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over such a
dispute by asserting a claim of right to the pledged securities.
Whether the court would retain jurisdiction in a reorganization
proceeding remains a more open question. It can be argued that,
even if a reorganization court were to retain such jurisdiction, a
SIEPC court might not, because (a) the court has no right to upset
liens or interfere with rights of set-off;8 or (b) the jurisdiction of
the SIPC court is simply that of a court in a chapter X proceeding
where an order pursuant to section 102 has been entered. To
counter this argument, however, a trustee might point out that
time is, inevitably, of the essence in a SIPC liquidation; the vola-
tile nature and perishable value of the securities pledged require
the SIPC court to retain jurisdiction of any controversy concern-
ing such securities.
SIPA § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(1) (1970).
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C. Transfer Agents and Clearing Corporations
At the present time, the SEC has no authority over transfer
agents, depositories, or clearing corporations, unless the deposito-
ries or clearing agencies happen to be owned and operated by self-
regulatory organizations which are subject to the administrative
jurisdiction of the Commission."5 Since the only members of SIPC
are broker-dealers, SIPC has no authority over transfer agents,
depositories, or clearing agencies.
At the time a broker-dealer becomes bankrupt, securities
and cash of the firm and its customers probably will be located
at these transfer agents, depositories, and clearing agencies. Un-
less these entities file claims in the SIPC liquidation, they will not
be parties to the proceedings, and the court will not have personal
jurisdiction over them. Any jurisdiction which the court may be
called upon to exercise would necessarily apply to the property
of the debtor pursuant to section 5(b)(2) of the 1970 Act."
Whether such jurisdiction is appropriate where the property in
dispute is not that of the debtor, but rather, that of the debtor's
customers, is problematic. Furthermore, jurisdiction might be
challenged if a claim of right, such as a set-off or lien, were as-
serted against the property by the transfer agent, depository, or
clearing agency. Similar problems might arise with respect to
profits from the sale of stock exchange seats in situations where
an exchange asserts a right of set-off against a member which has
become bankrupt. The justifications for the SIPC court's reten-
tion of jurisdiction to adjudicate any such controversies are simi-
lar to the reasons set forth above for such retention in the case of
pledged property.
Another type of situation in which a trustee might wish to
invoke the authority of the SIPC court may arise when distribu-
tions of securities are made to customers, and the trustee must
transfer these securities into the names of such customers. Under
the 1970 Act, the trustee is accorded very little discretion in ma-
king distributions of securities to customers, particularly where
specifically identifiable property is involved. Nevertheless, the
trustee may not have securities in street name in the denomina-
8 A principal conclusion of the SEC was that the Commission needed additional
authority in the area of securities processing. STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRAC'nCES
OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Two currently
pending bills, S. 2058 and H.R. 5050, incorporate provisions for the regulation of transfer
agents, clearing agencies, and securities depositaries.
SIPA § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2) (1970).
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tions owed to customers, particularly if the trustee-has been com-
pelled to prorate the securities.9' If the transfer agent has re-
signed, or for any other reason is unwilling or unable to follow
requests by the trustee to transfer the securities in his possession
into customers' names, there would seem to be no way in which
the trustee could adjudicate such a controversy before the SIPC
court, unless the transfer agent happened to have filed a claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding or consented to summary jurisdic-
tion. Happily, this problem has proved to be more theoretical
than practical since most transfer agents consent to the summary
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, an entirely proper method
of resolving such transfer problems.
D. Subordinated Lenders
Most brokerage firms maintain a portion of their capital in
the form of subordinated debt. This is specifically permitted pur-
suant to the net capital rule of the SEC and comparable stock
exchange rules.92 Under the present New York Stock Exchange
forms for subordinated loans, either a cash-subordinated loan is
made, or a note obligation for a specified sum of money is signed
by the lender and is then collateralized by securities. If the securi-
ties fluctuate in value, the lender is to bear the risk of gain or loss.
In earlier types of New York Stock Exchange agreements, and in
many forms of subordinated loan agreements used by the regional
stock exchanges, securities rather than cash, or a fixed debt obli-
gation, may be subordinated. If these securities fluctuate in
value, it would appear that the risk of gain or loss rests with the
broker-dealer. Under applicable SEC rules, securities may be
subordinated, although a brokerage account as such may not be.
Although there has been some litigation between subordi-
nated lenders and bankrupt broker-dealers, or their principals,
arising out of the numerous broker-dealer failures of the past
several years,93 the rights and obligations of the parties to these
agreements continue to be far from clear. Under the 1970 Act,
Although a customer's securities may be "specifically identifiable" pursuant to
section 6(c)(2)(C)(iii) of SIPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2)(C)(iii) (1970), and rule 15c3-3j)
under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3Uj) (1973), the trustee may nevertheless
have shortages of that security, and be required to prorate the shares he does have on hand
in order to satisfy the claims of all the customers.
"Rule 15c3-1(c)(7) under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(7) (1973); New
York Stock Exchange Rule 325; American Stock Exchange Rule 470.
' See, e.g., Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm.
SEC. L. REP. 94,133 at 94,525 (D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973); Caddell v. Goodbody & Co., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,938 at 93,736 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 1972).
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subordinated lenders are specifically excluded from the definition
of customers."
Even though subordinated lenders may not be entitled to
SIPC advances, they usually will file a claim in a SIPC proceed-
ing, hoping at least to be entitled to payment as a general creditor
or a subordinated creditor if there are sufficient assets in the
estate. However, in a situation where securities, which have been
subordinated by a lender, have decreased in value, or were pre-
maturely withdrawn from the firm prior to bankruptcy, the
trustee may wish to institute suit against the subordinated lender
to recover assets for the bankrupt estate. If the subordinated
lender has not filed a claim in the proceeding and, by so doing,
has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
it would appear that the trustee cannot institute an action
against him within the context of the SIPC proceeding.
E. Brokerage Account Customers and Claimants
The most important purpose of the 1970 Act was to provide
insurance coverage within certain specified limits to customers of
firms having gone into bankruptcy." Immediately after liquida-
tion proceedings are commenced, the trustee sends claim forms
to all of the customers of a broker-dealer whose names he is able
to ascertain. At the time claim forms are sent out, the trustee may
not know whether the bankrupt owed securities or cash to such
customers, or whether such customers owed securities or cash to
the bankrupt. Eventually, the trustee may decide to initiate liti-
gation against various customers to collect debit balances in their
accounts.
If customers who owe securities or monies to the broker-
dealer file claims, the trustee can object to such claims and
counterclaim against them within the context of the SIPC pro-
ceeding. However, if no claims have been filed by such customers,
the trustee must institute litigation against them in separate law
suits.
The bankruptcy court would appear, therefore, to have nei-
ther summary nor plenary jurisdiction over such customers.
Moreover, although a trustee might attempt to sue such custo-
mers in the federal courts, alleging that he was bringing suit
" SIPA § 6(c)(2)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c) (2)(A)(ii) (1970).
,5 Duffy, Reforming SIPC, REv. SEc. REG. VoL. 7, No. 2 at 985-88 (January 31, 1974).
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pursuant to a federal statute, namely, the 1970 Act, this would
seem to be a weak jurisdictional handle. More likely, the trustee
would be compelled to sue in state court unless he were alleging
a violation of the securities acts or there were diversity of citizen-
ship and the amount in controversy were in excess of ten thou-
sand dollars. Although the long-arm statute of most states might
permit the trustee to institute litigation where the broker-dealer
had its principal place of business, and presumably in the juris-
diction where the bankruptcy proceedings were pending, a cus-
tomer who dealt with a branch office of the broker-dealer might
be able to contest such a claim of jurisdiction. 3
Although the trustee in litigation proceedings for any other
business probably would be faced with the same jurisdictional
problems in attempting to collect accounts receivable, this proce-
dure would seem inordinately expensive and complicated in the
context of a SIPC litigation. Many customers owing broker-
dealers small sums of money might well escape without payment
to the debtor simply because the cost of collection in a plenary
lawsuit could not be justified. Yet, the same customer might
make a claim in another SIPC liquidation and be paid with
moneys advanced from SIPC.0 The facts and the law applicable
in a collection case against a broker-dealer customer are relatively
simple, and it would seem more equitable and practical for such
cases to be conducted before the court which is handling the
entire bankruptcy.
F. Officers and Employees
Officers and employees may also file claims in a bankruptcy
See, e.g., Drexel Burnham & Co. v. Silverman, 75 Misc. 2d 904, 349 N.Y.S.2d 293
(Civ. Ct. 1973)(no long-arm jurisdiction for transaction of business in New York in suit
brought by New York brokerage firm against defaulting purchasers where sole connection
with the state was purchase order by non-resident individual defendants at plaintiffs
Pennsylvania branch office for trade executed on New York Stock Exchange). But where
non-resident's activities amount to more than mere solicitation of buy or sell order, juris.
diction may lie. Cf. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 25?6 N.E.2d
506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, (1970) (non-resident individual defendant subject to long-arm
jurisdiction where he has defaulted on purchase price for auctioned art pieces when he
"borrowed" plaintiff's employee through use of open telephone line to participate in New
York auction from outside of the state).
11 In such a situation, SIPC would not be in a position to avail itself of the provisions
of section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970). In SEC v. Morgan, Kennedy
& Co., the trustee for another firm undergoing liquidation pursuant to SIPA, Equitable
Equities, Inc., moved for a stay of any distribution to a customer of Morgan, Kennedy &
Co., who was being sued by the Equitable Equities, Inc. trustee. Bankruptcy Judge Babitt
denied the application. 73 Civ. 1057 (S.D.N.Y., filed March 9, 1973).
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proceeding, particularly for wages owed to them by the debtor. If
so, the bankruptcy court would seem likely to have jurisdiction,
thus enabling the trustee to assert any counterclaims against
such persons. However, if no claims are filed by such persons and
the trustee has a claim against any of them, the problems dis-
cussed elsewhere in this article will prevail. The trustee must
institute litigation in the state or federal court depending upon
the nature of his claim.
In certain types of situations, the trustee might be able to
claim the property of the debtor to be involved in the dispute, and
assert jurisdiction on that ground. For example, the trustee might
attack draws taken by officers or employees, a common compen-
sation arrangement in brokerage firms. Here again, however, the
officers or employees could assert a substantial adverse claim to
the property; it is probable that the trustee would lose such a bid
for jurisdiction in a SIPC court.
G. General Creditors
The status of general creditors in a SIPC proceeding is essen-
tially the same as that of general creditors in any other bank-
ruptcy proceeding. However, it is less clear that general creditors
become parties to the proceeding by the mere filing of a claim,
particularly since such claims are filed with the trustee rather
than with the court
55
By and large, general creditors are rather neglected in these
proceedings. There is no clear authority requiring a first meeting
of creditors to be held, since the trustee is selected by SIPC rather
than by the creditors. In the earliest SIPC liquidations, many
trustees held such meetings solely for the purpose of fixing the
time within which claims by creditors had to be filed, and other
trustees simply held no such meetings at all. However, it has
become the standard practice to have a first meeting of creditors,
since SIPC is of the opinion that such meetings are necessary.
Moreover, the 1970 Act appears to designate the time within
which customer claims may be filed as sixty days after the notice
of claim is sent, a shorter period than the six months provided for
1' It should be noted that SIPA does not require claims of either customers or creditors
to be filed with the trustee or any other particular person. SIPA courts have implied from
SIPA § 6(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(g) (1970), which waives the necessity for customers to file
formal proofs of claims, that Congress intended to have claims filed directly with the
trustee. The courts have followed the practice that claims of both customers and creditors
be filed with the trustee, even though creditors are not absolved from the requirement that
formal proofs of claims be filed.
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in the Bankruptcy Act.9 In addition, the right of creditors to form
a creditors' committee in a SIPC liquidation seems arguable.c'
Since many of the procedures under the Bankruptcy Act
have been fashioned from the point of view of protecting and
informing creditors of the bankrupt, and inasmuch as a SIPC
proceeding operates from such a radically different point of
view, the applicability of many of these procedures is arguable.
However, in the absence of procedures specifically described-
by Congress, the SEC, SIPC, or some other concerned agency
-trustees will be forced to rely on existing bankruptcy proce-
dures and precedents.
III. EFFECT ON NEW LEGISLATION UPON SIPA
A. The New Bankruptcy Rules
Since the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure became effective
on October 1, 1973,101 SIPA liquidations referred to a bankruptcy
judge have been conducted pursuant thereto. The practical effect
of these rules, in those situations where rule 701-defined "adver-
sary proceedings" are necessary, is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will apply in the bankruptcy court, subject to appro-
priate modification.
For example, rather than seeking an order to show cause for
the turnover of property sought by the trustee for the estate, the
trustee files a complaint under rule 703 and serves a summons
pursuant to rule 704. Similarly, discovery procedures, pleading
rules, counterclaims, joinder, and other procedures are governed
by the same principles as is an ordinary suit in a district court
under the Federal Rules.
Because bankruptcy court and district court procedures are
now practically indistinguishable types of adversary proceedings,
it would seem foolish to require a trustee to judge correctly
whether summary jurisdiction exists in the bankruptcy court, or
whether plenary suit in the district court is mandated. There are
11 SIPA § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(e) (1970); Bankruptcy Act § 57(n), 11 U.S.C.
§ 93(n) (1970).
w In SEC v. Weis Sec., Inc., 73 Civ. 2332 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 24,1973), Bankruptcy
Judge Babitt denied a petition to appoint a creditors' committee under section 44(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 72(b) (1970), on the grounds that the method oftelecting
a SIPA trustee is "not compatible" with a creditors' committee, and that the trustee was
generally not in opposition to the creditors' position (as per order of January 9, 1974).
"I Order of Supreme Court of April 24, 1973 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970)), appearing at 411 U.S. 989 (1973).
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no meaningful procedural benefits to be obtained by fractionating
the court's jurisdiction into summary and plenary suits. Possibly
the only substantive difference between such suits is the right to
jury trial, but jury trial would not be available or utilized in many
plenary suits in any event.
In most cases, a SIPA trustee would prefer to keep all of the
liquidation proceedings under one judicial roof. If, however, an
adverse claimant refuses to consent to summary jurisdiction, the
trustee faces either the expense and delay of contesting the juris-
dictional issue or the bringing of a separate plenary suit. Where
the liquidation has been referred to a bankruptcy judge, the situ-
ation is even more complicated. If the bankruptcy judge deter-
mines that summary jurisdiction does not exist, he may now
transfer the dispute, pursuant to rule 915(b), to the civil docket
of the district court where appropriate. If federal and state claims
are involved, the trustee could be met with arguments concerning
the presence or absence of pendent jurisdiction over the state
claims, so that further division of the suit might take place.
B. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States recently presented a lengthy report on the present Bank-
ruptcy Act, accompanied by a draft of a new Bankruptcy Act with
explanatory notes. The proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973 was
introduced as H. 10792 in the House of Representatives, on Octo-
ber 9, 1973, and S. 2565 in the Senate, on October 11, 1973.
Preliminary hearings were held by the House Committee on the
Judiciary, on December 10, 1973, but progress of the bill was
halted, the victim of other pressing business."2 Although a full
analysis of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act is beyond the scope of
this article, some comments may be made about the possible
effects of this proposal upon SIPA liquidations.
The Proposed Bankruptcy Act radically reforms the nature
of the bankruptcy process. A major goal of the Commission is to
redistribute the workload of the present bankruptcy courts by
creating an administrative unit to handle most of the bankruptcy
matters, and reserving for the courts only specified matters adju-
dicative in nature. Under SIPA, the trustee is already performing
many of the administrative tasks which Congress realized are
not required to be processed by the court. For example, claims are
'* Bankruptcy Report, supra note 79. Immediately prior to publication of this Arti.
cle, on September 12, 1974, this bill was reintroduced in the House of Representatives with
substantive changes. Time did not permit revision of this Article to discuss these changes.
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filed with the trustee and not with the court. In this area, the
Proposed Bankruptcy Act is taking a most worthwhile direction
by treating much of the liquidation as administrative, rather than
judicial. Although the Commission deliberately avoided any sub-
stantive amendments to SIPA until proper legislation could be
drafted, it did propose a series of conforming amendments. How-
ever, certain anomalies would result if the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act were passed in its present form and SIPA were not also
amended. For example, SIPA incorporates various provisions of
the present Bankruptcy Act-such as section 102-which would
still be incorporated into SIPA. It is therefore possible that
SIPA might incorporate by reference provisions which have
gone out of existence with the passage of the Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act, or that the court might "trace" the old provisions
into their newer versions where applicable. Such problems must
be clarified directly by amending SIPA prior to, or concurrently
with, the enactment of any new Bankruptcy Act.
The most heartwarming proposal by the Commission is to
remove at last the distinction between summary and plenary
suits. Under Proposed Bankruptcy Act section 2-201, jurisdiction
is given to the bankruptcy court to hear "all controversies" that
arise under the Bankruptcy Act. The Commission states rather
emphatically that,
[t]he distinctions between summary and plenary proceed-
ings, and between the scope of jurisdiction conferred for straight
bankruptcy under Chapters 1-Vil and that conferred by each of
the several rehabilitation chapters, which are breeders of point-
less litigation over where litigation should be conducted, are all
abolished."'
SIPA liquidations would be immeasurably aided if the SIPA
court had the jurisdiction proposed by the Commission for the
new Bankruptcy Act.
C. Report of the SIPC Task Force
Having had a few years of experience administering the 1970
Act, SIPC established a Task Force to study the various short-
comings inherent in SIPA, with a view to proposing remedial
11 Id., Part I at 6.
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amendments. The Task Force has recently published its report 1'
and recommendations, some of which concern the problems dis-
cussed in this article.
The Task Force Report recommends that SIPA be amended
so as to set forth expressly those provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
which should apply in a SIPA proceeding,, rather than relying
upon the unwieldly partial-incorporation approach.' 3 Clearly,
acceptance of this recommendation will eliminate an unnecessary
variable in SIPA liquidations; we therefore agree with the Task
Force Report insofar as SIPA is to be freed from the Bankruptcy
Act.
However, in listing those areas in which the Bankruptcy Act
procedures should be carried over into the 1970 Act, the Task
Force Report merely recommends that the SIPA court have
"exclusive jurisdiction over the broker or dealer and its property
wherever situated."'' 0 A great deal more thought should be given,
in our opinion, to a jurisdictional provision specifically tailored
to SIPA liquidations. For example, it is most unfortunate that the
Task Force Report did not specifically recommend that the SIPA
court be given summary jurisdiction over nonconsenting adverse
claimants in possession of property claimed by the trustee. Nor
did the Task Force Report indicate a position upon whether or not
plenary suits, if required, are to be subject to the restrictions of
section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act.'17 Clarification of these issues
would be helpful.
The Task Force Report does recommend that the trustee be
given authority to advance SIPC funds to pay or guaranty the
debtor's bank loans when necessary to reclaim customers' securi-
ties pledged by the debtor as collateral.' 8 There would seem to
be no reasonable objection by the pledgee-banks to releasing the
collateral upon satisfaction of the balance due, so the jurisdic-
tional problems might sometimes be avoided by this recommen-
dation. However, in those instances where the balance outstand-
ing is greater than the collateral being held by the bank, SIPC
might be unwilling to advance funds to pay the balance, the bank
"SIPC, Report to the Board of Directors of the Securities Investor Protection Corpo-
ration of the Special Task Force to Consider Possible Amendments to the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (July 1974) [hereinafter cited as the Task Force Report].
" Id. at 34-38.
'' Id. at 36.
,07 Bankruptcy Act § 23, 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
'a Task Force Report, note 104 supra, at 10.
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might interpose its adverse claim and the trustee would again be
confronted with the summary-plenary jurisdictional puzzle.
Again, the Task Force Report's suggestion is well taken, but the
court should be given jurisdiction over the parties where disputes
arise.
Similarly, the Task Force Report proposes that SIPC be au-
thorized to join or enter into contractual agreements with clearing
corporations and depositories.10 Substantively, this is an im-
provement of some merit, but the 1970 Act should clearly confer
jurisdiction in the SIPA court over disputes between SIPC and a
recalcitrant transfer agent or depository. Without clarification of
the jurisdictional issue, SIPC could become bogged down in the
present procedural tangle of where the dispute should be adjudi-
cated.
Another ambiguity the Task Force Report would resolve is
the authority for reference of SIPA liquidations to the Bank-
ruptcy judges." 0 The Task Force Report also would increase
SIPC's administrative functions, especially in the liquidation of
smaller broker-dealers, where no independent trustee would be
appointed."' A parallel exists between SIPC's role and the role
envisioned for a federal administrative unit under the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act.1 2 However, unless SIPC's authority and the ju-
risdiction of the SIPA court are clarified and expanded, we be-
lieve SIPC will be unable to handle such increased administrative
responsibilities expeditiously.
CONCLUSION
The 1970 Act is obscure enough to elude concert in interpre-
tation. As a piece of remedial legislation, it should be construed
liberally," 3 but the view of the bankruptcy bar and bench toward
SIPA is understandably conservative. Congress indiscriminately
incorporated the Bankruptcy Act into SIPA, and applicable
bankruptcy provisions have been interpreted mechanistically.
Moreover, SIPC is not a federal administrative agency, but is,
rather, an insurance company which supplies neither SIPA
trustees nor staff support for most SIPA liquidations. Conse-
quently, its ability to fashion creative solutions to the problems
posed by SIPA liquidations remains limited.
IC Id. at 31. See text accompanying notes 89.91 supra.
21 Task Force Report, note 104 supra, at 36.
" Id. at 29.
'z Id. at 27, 37.
"' See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1084 (1972); Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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It is our contention that amendments to the 1970 Act giving
more expansive and more explicit jurisdictional authority to the
SIPA court would achieve less expensive and speedier liquida-
tions. In particular, the district court judge making an adjudica-
tion under section 5(b) should be given specific authority to dele-
gate the proceedings to a bankruptcy judge; the SIPA court
should be given both summary and plenary jurisdiction; and
SIPC or the SIPA court should be given some specific jurisdic-
tional authority over banks, transfer agents, and clearing houses
involved in the debtor's liquidation, as well as over subordinated
lenders, customers, officers, and employees of the debtor. In addi-
tion, should a new federal bankruptcy statute be enacted, as
proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws, the 1970
Act should be concurrently amended to conform to the new bank-
ruptcy statute, or else SIPA liquidations should be removed en-
tirely from bankruptcy administration and adjudication.
